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SYMPOSIUM
CONFRONTING THE WALL OF SEPARATION: A NEW
DIALOGUE BETWEEN LAW AND RELIGION ON THE
MEANING OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Craig B. Mousin*
Thomas Jefferson's enduring metaphor describing the religion
clauses of the First Amendment1 set the foundation for the long-
standing "wall of separation between church and State."'2 In the Bi-
centennial Year of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the DePaul
University College of Law Center for Church/State Studies con-
vened a two-day conference to examine the underpinnings of that
metaphor, evaluate its continued validity as a source of constitu-
tional jurisprudence, and explore other metaphors for understanding
the relationship between religion and government.3 The metaphor of
the wall has separated more than just church and state. In addition,
the wall has been employed to justify separating the discourse be-
tween religion and the law, dividing individual responses into public
and private segments, and concretizing perceptions of the state and
religion in our nation. Although much has been written on church
and state within the United States, the disciples of law and religion
* Executive Director, Center for Church/State Studies at DePaul University College of Law.
Professor Mousin is also an ordained minister at the Wellington Avenue United Church of Christ.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ... ).
2. ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 112 (1990) (quoting Thomas Jeffer-
son, Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 113-14 (H. Washington ed., 1853)).
3. The DePaul University College of Law Center for Church/State Studies sponsored the Con-
ference in Chicago on December 6 and 7, 1991. The Conference would not have been possible
without the encouragement and contributions of the Center's Friends and Supporters and funding
support from the University Research Council of DePaul University. Thanks and recognition are
also due to Thomas C. Berg, Amy Cranford, Patty Gerstenblith, Robin Lovin, and William P.
Marshall for their assistance in planning and implementing the Conference.
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have often labored in separate vineyards when describing that rela-
tionship of religion and government. Consequently, the spheres of
law and religion have often developed distinct understandings of the
relationship between religion and the state, often to the detriment of
both. Although courts have struggled with whether the wall should
block all influence of church and state on each other, or permit
some joint involvement in public life, the decisions in the courthouse
frequently failed to understand the reality within the house of wor-
ship. Supreme Court cases and their interpretation in the lower
courts, moreover, record the government's understanding of the rela-
tionship with religion. Thus, the official record remains skewed in
favor of the state's analysis.
Recognizing that much of constitutional jurisprudence and schol-
arly work on the First Amendment has been dominated by legal
scholars and judges, the Conference sought to provide a forum for
scholars of both religion and law to engage in a new dialogue. By
gathering scholars from both sides of the wall, the Conference in-
tended to encourage and enrich the dialogue between church and
state, question old assumptions, and expose representatives of each
side to the language and theories of those encamped on the other
side of the wall. Although theological and legal language may differ,
the reality that religion exists within society necessitates that shared
concerns must be addressed. Different approaches may shed new in-
sights into old debates.
Sallie McFague, for example, notes that religious language runs
the risk of becoming both idolatrous and irrelevant.' Idolatrous
freezing of language into authoritative and literal images often ex-
cludes persons from access while diminishing the power of the initial
metaphor.5 Frequent repetition without a full understanding of the
context of the metaphor, however, leads to irrelevance." For
McFague, to avoid the twin problems of idolatry and irrelevance,
metaphorical language must be interpreted within "the relativity
and plurality of the interpretive context."7
Metaphorical language has posed the same problem for the
courts. The first time the Supreme Court cited Jefferson's metaphor,
4. SALLIE MCFAGUE, METAPHORICAL THEOLOGY: MODELS OF GOD IN RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
2 (1982).
5. Id. at 4-7.
6. Id. at 7-10.
7. Id. at 3.
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Chief Justice Waite stated that Jefferson's wall "may be accepted
almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the
amendment . . ." In the hundred years following that decision,
the wall has remained remarkably resilient, echoing, however, some
of McFague's concerns about the consequences of idolatry. Not only
has it served as a template for Establishment Clause decisions since
1947, it has become the starting point for judicial and public under-
standing of the complexity of the relationship between government
and religion.9
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffreel parallels
McFague's problem with irrelevant metaphorical language in his
critique of the wall's relevance:
But the greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its mischievous diversion of
judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. The
"crucible of litigation," is well adapted to adjudicating factual disputes on
the basis of testimony presented in court, but no amount of repetition of
historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true. The "wall of
separation between church and State" is a metaphor based on bad history, a
metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be
frankly and explicitly abandoned."
Changing historical context and loss of original meaning have led
others to question the relevance of the wall for contemporary
society.
To provide the interpretive context necessary to avoid both idola-
try and irrelevance for the wall of separation, the Conference gath-
ered both legal and religious scholars for a discussion on the contin-
ued validity or abandonment of the metaphor of the wall of
separation. By disassembling the barrier that for too long has ob-
structed discourse on important issues of religion and government,
the Conference further sought to address the wall's continuing vital-
8. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
9. In Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), decided subsequent to the Conference, Justice
Blackmun again cited Jefferson's wall of separation in his concurrence to support his observation
that the Court's jurisprudence on the Establishment Clause had distilled one clear understanding.
Id. at 2662. The utility of the metaphor, both in court cases and in the popular culture remains
strong. Its exact meaning and the intent are somewhat more circumspect. Gallup polls in 1988
reveal that 79% of Americans support the principle of separation of church and state. In a sepa-
rate poll, however, Gallup also reported that of those who were aware that a constitutional amend-
ment had been proposed to permit prayer in public schools, 68% favored the amendment.
GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & SARAH JONES. 100 QUESTIONS & ANSWERS: RELIGION IN AMERICA 134-
37 (1989).
10. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
11. Id. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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ity for both religion in the United States and constitutional
jurisprudence.
To fully understand the power of the metaphor, however, one
must recognize that it has separated more than just the discourse
between law and religion. Part of its sustaining strength has been its
ability to separate spheres of action within our society. Under that
philosophical divide, political decisions and decisive action belong
within the state's bailiwick; private belief and conscience should re-
main on their side of the wall. Jefferson distinguished between con-
science and works in behalf of that conscience. Although courts and
scholars most frequently quote the one phrase in the Danbury Bap-
tist letter that generates the wall metaphor, the full quote reveals
the significance Jefferson placed on separating conscience and
action:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man
and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship,
that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not opin-
ions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus
building a wall of separation between church and State. Adhering to this
expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of con-
science, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments
which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no
natural right in opposition to his social duties."2
The Supreme Court seized Jefferson's modification of the impregna-
bility of the wall to separate and distinguish types of free exercise
claims. In denying Mr. Reynolds's free exercise claim, the Supreme
Court emphasized that "Congress was denied of all legislative power
over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order."'" Over a cen-
tury later in Employment Division v. Smith,'4 the Court presented
scant historical evidence that the good order of the state had been
sabotaged by conscience; nevertheless, the Court concluded that to
accept a test that permitted exceptions to laws for "all actions
thought to be religiously commanded" would be "courting anar-
12. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 2, at 112 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Reply to the Dan-
bury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)).
13. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
14. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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chy."' By separating conscience from action, the metaphor has
helped limit religion to the private sphere.
Former Chief Justice Waite in his Reynolds opinion implicitly
raised a further barrier separating law and religion that sustains the
distinction between church and state and remains unchallenged if
religion commentators have less than equal access to the discourse.
In noting Jefferson's role as an advocate for the Bill of Rights and
the authoritative effect of his role within the formation of the Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights, 6 Waite substantiated Jefferson's
view of the state's primacy in the relationship controlled by this
metaphor. Significantly, the First Amendment limits congressional
action over religion, and since incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment, state action as well. Religion enters the public dis-
course voluntarily when its members participate in society, but as
Michael McConnell points out, different religious groups will decide
theologically and ecclesiologically whether to participate or remain
apart from culture. 17 Some will argue for the sovereignty of religion
and belief over the demands of the state, 8 yet the Supreme Court's
acceptance of Jefferson's logic leaves them little alternative. For
those religious persons who seek to influence society, the wall be-
comes the initial obstructing involvement. For those who seek to re-
main apart from culture, the primacy of that state requires obedi-
ence to the general laws of society in maintaining the state's order
notwithstanding religious objection to them. The variety of religious
experience within this nation suggests, however, that mere appeals
to the wall of separation will fail to resolve these questions.
McFague stresses that religious language can be simultaneously
idolatrous and irrelevant."9 This constitutional metaphor has faced
the same fate. In addition to Chief Justice Rehnquist's attack on the
irrelevance of the metaphor, others recognize some of the cracks in
its ability to withstand the historical changes our nation has exper-
ienced since the ratification of the First Amendment. John Wilson
15. Id. at 888 (holding that neutral laws of general applicability can withstand free exercise
claims seeking judicially established exemptions from the law).
16. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
17. See Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191 (1992).
18. Compare, for example, McConnell's reference to James Madison's belief that religion is
"exempt from the authority of the Society at large" to Jefferson's restriction on action. Id. at 192
n.7.
19. McFAGUE, supra note 4, at 2.
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argues that the crumbling of the Protestant hegemony places inter-
pretation of the religion clauses in a completely different context
than when they were drafted.20 Wilson also points out that when
Christianity dominated the culture, the issue of legal separation was
less critical, and therefore, not challenged.2 1 As hegemonic influence
waned, the consequences of the separation became more dramatic
and called into question the relevance of the wall in a pluralistic
society. 2 Moreover, the expanding role of government in citizens'
lives contrasts with the earliest days of the Republic. For many, the
reality of government. action in their lives makes the wall's separa-
tion an unfair restriction on religious participation in public life.
Given the twin challenge to current understandings of church and
state, the Conference marked a timely moment to re-examine the
wall's continued relevance. Marking two hundred years of the First
Amendment's impact on this particular democracy, it also fell after
the Supreme Court's Employment Division v. Smith2 decision and
the initial ramifications of a new Free Exercise Clause test an-
nounced therein and before the Court ruled on the challenge to the
Establishment Clause test in Lee v. Weisman.24 The significant chal-
lenges to the constitutional tests recently made in Smith and Lee as
well as the current efforts to enact the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act 28 made it appropriate to bring together both sides in this
dialogue.
Three main papers were presented on the first day of the Confer-
ence to provide a foundation for that interpretive context of the
Conference. Recognizing that judicial pronouncements on the
proper relation of religion and society have often unfairly empha-
sized the state's side of the wall, the Conference first discussed the
historical perspective of religion's views of the law of church and
state. James Washington opened the session with an analysis of the
transformation of the role of conscience since the drafting of the
20. John F. Wilson, Religion, Political Culture, and the Law, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 821, 823
(1992). See also ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
IN AMERICA 1880-1920 (1991) (arguing that increasing governmental and religious complexity
and growth of the immigrant population make the terms church and state less descriptive of the
realities in America and fail to express the change in the culture from a Protestant one to a less
Christian-centered culture).
21. Wilson, supra note 20, at 831-32.
22. Id. at 835.
23, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
24. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
25. H.R. 5377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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First Amendment." Finding that the cultural understanding of the
role of conscience in society and the individual changed dramati-
cally with the loss of the sacred understanding of conscience, Wash-
ington points out that the evisceration of conscience prevented its
ability to call the state into question when both the law and culture
supported, for example, slavery, wars, or, in some cases, implicitly
condoned the killing fields of the twentieth century.27 While some
theologians have raised the question of how one practices theology
after the Holocaust,28 Washington poses the equally disturbing di-
lemma-of how one now approaches church-state relations given this
century's disregard for life from the Holocaust to the gulags, death
camps, and death squads. 9 Washington calls for a renewed commit-
ment to the "sanctity of the body" as a necessary element of con-
science. 0 Otherwise, even if the Court accepts Jefferson's assur-
ances that "the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of
conscience" ' protects religious liberty, the protection becomes a
meaningless gesture. Douglas Sturm 2 and Mark Fackler"3 offer al-
ternative religious perspectives on conscience, while Cole Durham34
and Laura Underkuffier 31 approach Washington's notion of con-
science from the law's perspective.
Stanley Hauerwas and Michael Baxter's contemporary perspec-
tive of religion's views of the law of church and state also empha-
sizes the role of conscience.36 For Hauerwas and Baxter, however,
the legal debate regarding the relationship between church and state
26. See James M. Washington, The Crisis in the Sanctity of Conscience in American Jurispru-
dence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 11 (1992).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., EMIL L. FACKENHEIM, GOD'S PRESENCE IN HISTORY: JEWISH AFFIRMATIONS AND
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS (1970); PAUL M. VAN BUREN, A THEOLOGY OF THE JEWISH-CHRIS-
TIAN REALITY, PART 3: CHRIST IN CONTEXT 156-82 (1988); Gordon Legge, Spiritual Withering
Affects More than Christians, CALGARY HERALD, Apr. 18, 1992, at GI.
29. Washington, supra note 26.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Thomas Jefferson, Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113-14 (H. Washington ed., 1853)).
32. See Douglas Sturm, Repentance, Constitutionalism, and Sacrality, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 61
(1992).
33. See Mark Fackler, Christian Voices in the Public Square, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 89 (1.992).
34. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Liberty and the Call of Conscience, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 71 (1992).
35. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Individual Conscience and the Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 93
(1992).
36. See Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, C.S.C., The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom
of "Belief' Is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107 (1992).
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i's irrelevant as Christians owe total allegiance to the Kingdom of
Christ and any attempt to compromise that by the elusive elixir of
balancing between the loyalties of state and church leads to a priva-
tized conscience and a meaningless Christianity. Freedom of con-
science, by itself, hurts religion more than it helps if it only protects
beliefs that do not count or threaten the primacy of the state.
Michael Dyson, 7 Bryan Hehir,38 and Charles Strain 9 challenge
Hauerwas and Baxter's view of the relationship between state and
church arguing that Hauerwas and Baxter do not speak for all
Christians, let alone all people of faith. They relate the diverse ex-
periences of other faithful communities in reacting to the conflicting
loyalties of society and faith. John Garvey discusses some constitu-
tional issues raised by the Hauerwas and Baxter position.4 Freder-
ick Gedicks responds with both a legal analysis as well as a powerful
personal testimony of how the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints reacted to the Supreme Court's rulings against the United
States."1
Finally, Michael McConnell examines how the law, through its
Supreme Court decisions, has defined the role of religion in soci-
ety. 2 McConnell relies on H. Richard Niebuhr's taxonomy in
Christ and Culture43 to analyze how the law has protected or pun-
ished those different religious communities.4 " Asserting that the
Court has issued different decisions based on, for example, its per-
ceptions that the "Church" was "Aligned with Culture" or in "Con-
flict with Culture" or "Apart from Culture," McConnell notes that
whenever conscience moved to action that threatened the state, .the
state, through its courts, prevailed.4 5  Ira Lupu41 and Mark
Tushnet47 challenge both the diversity of the religious response of
37. See Michael Eric Dyson, "God Almighty Has Spoken from Washington, D.C. ": American
Society and Christian Faith, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 129 (1992).
38. See J. Bryan Hehir, Church-State and Church-World, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 175 (1992).
39. See Charles R. Strain, Religious Freedom and the Cultural Captivity of Religion in
America: An Argument for Religious Pluralism, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 181 (1992).
40. See John H. Garvey, Hauerwas on Religious Freedom, 42 DEPAUL L. REV, 161 (1992).
41. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley
Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167 (1992).
42. See McConnell, supra note 17.
43. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951).
44. McConnell, supra note 17.
45. Id. /
46. See Ira C. Lupu, Models of Church-State Interaction and the Strategy of the Religion
Clauses, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 223 (1992).
47. See Mark V. Tushnet, Disaggregating "Church" and "Culture", 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 235
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the Niebuhrian scheme and its helpfulness in a nation governed by
the Constitution.
Given the foundation of the discussions that resulted from these
presentations, the second day of the conference focused on Free Ex-
ercise Clause and Establishment Clause issues. Again following the
format of a mixed panel of religion and legal scholars, the first panel
inquired into whether the First Amendment is hostile to religion.
Edward Gaffney,48 Gerard Bradley,49 William Marshall,"° and Jef-
frey Shaman5 discuss different schools of thought regarding free
exercise jurisprudence while Robin Lovin5 2 offers a perspective on
human freedom that calls into question the efficacy of relying on
traditional judicial understandings of religious freedom. The second
panel examines whether the United States still needs an Establish-
ment Clause. In keeping with the purpose of expanding the interpre-
tive context of these two clauses, Susan Gilles53 and Richard Kay 54
provide a comparative analysis of the Canadian and British exper-
iences in democratic societies with established churches. Daniel
Conkle 55 and Douglas Laycock 56 compare the American experience
under its Establishment Clause.
Finally, a word about format. To engage in this new dialogue, the
intent of the planners of the Conference was to encourage new per-
spectives on the relationship of religion and government. By facili-
tating dialogue through a reduced emphasis on prepared papers, it
was hoped that the language and theories of the different disciplines
would provide the interpretive context necessary to fully examine
the separation of state and church. In keeping with that format, we
(1992).
48' See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 263 (1992).
49. See Gerard V. Bradley, Protecting Religious Liberty: Judicial and Legislative Responsibil-
ities, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (1992).
50. See William P. Marshall, Is the Constitutional Concern with Religious Involvement in the
Public Square Hostility?, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 305 (1992).
51. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Is Constitutional Jurisprudence Hostile to Religion?, 42 DEPAUL
L. REV. 317 (1992).
52. See Robin Lovin, What Kind of Freedom Does Religion Need?, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 311
(1992).
53. See Susan M. Gilles, "Worldly Corruptions" and "Ecclesiastical Depredations": How Bad
Is an Established Church?, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 349 (1992).
54. See Richard S. Kay, The Canadian Constitution and the Dangers of Establishment, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 361 (1992).
55. See Daniel 0. Conkle, God Loveth Adverbs, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 339 (1992).
56. See Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373
(1992).
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have published most of these presentations, adding footnotes and the
necessary editing of the oral presentations. Some of the participants,
however, have responded to the issues raised at the Conference and
requested that we include their expanded comments in this issue.
We have noted those papers where appropriate. Similarly, the Con-
ference participants were encouraged to engage panelists in discus-
sion following the presentations. Accordingly, we have attempted to
incorporate some of the conversations that followed the initial
presentations in an informal manner to capture the full flavor of the
dialogues started by our main panelists. Moreover, questions and
discussions would often build upon discussions from previous panels.
The plurality of opinions follow. We trust you will find them a
helpful companion in seeking understanding of the First Amend-
ment. Not unsurprisingly, debates focused as much on differences of
opinion within religious understandings and legal doctrines as be-
tween law and religion. Nevertheless, the participants also posed
new questions for all scholars of church and state in our society. We
do not presume that all beliefs or disciplines could have been cov-
ered in this two-day conference. Indeed, this should start rather
than conclude this dialogue. But the necessity to continue this dis-
cussion between disciplines is recognized in Robin Lovin's conclud-
ing comment that our society will continue to struggle with the ap-
propriate relationship between government and religion "unless we
can come up with a legal conception of human freedom and its so-
cial context that is adequate to contemporary religious and philo-
sophical understandings of persons and their communities."5
57. Lovin, supra note 52, at 316.
[Vol. 42:1
